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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEO R. CASEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

NELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

Case No.
11721

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEl\:IENT OF TIIE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff's complaint claims:
1. Rental for motor grader in the sum of $2,589.30.

2. Damages in the sum of $12,000.00 for the al-

leged failure and refusal of the defendant to use the
motor grader after December 31, 1966.
Puuitive damages in the sum of $15,000.00.
( H:.!8)

I

Defendant appellant by amended answer denied
generally the allegations of the complaint, (R16) and
by amended counterclaim, set forth payments made on
account of plaintiff which defendant claimed as an offset. (R17-18)
The Fourth Cause of Action set forth in paragraph
13 of defendant's amended answer and amended counterclaim (R19) was stricken on motion of defendant.
(R75)

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
District Court held that a net amount due from
defendant to plaintiff for rental of the grader to December 21, 1966 was $468.47. (R53) It further held
that the defendant failed and refused to use said motor
grader after December 21, 1966, and plaintiff was damaged by said failure in the sum of $6,123.00. (R53)
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against
the defendant in the total sum of $6,591.47, together
with costs. ( R42) Defendant appealed from that portion of the judgment based on damages in the amount
of $6,123.00 "for defendant's breach of rental agreement on motor grader," from the order denying defendant's motion to amend proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment and from the order of
the court denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
(R61)
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HELIEF SOCGIIT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment of the District Court based on damages in the
amount of $6,123.00 "For defendant's breach of rental
agreement on motor grader" from the order <lenying
defendant's motion to amend proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law and judgment, or failing that,
defendant requests an order remanding said action to
District Court for a new trial on the single issue of
damages.

STATE:\IENT OF FACTS. Plaintiff entered
into a subcontract and equipment lease agreement
with defendant Nelson Brothers Construction Company in August of 1966 (Exhibit P-1) . In paragraph 16 of Exhibit P-1 it provides for leasing by
plaintiff to defendant of one No. 12 Caterpillar lVfotor
Grader to be operated exclusively by R. E. Casey
(Exhibit P-1, paragraph 16). A provision that R. C.
Casey be the sole operator was for the benefit of
<lefendant. ( ll99, lines 3 to 6 and :29-30) Thereafter,
the sub-contract was terminated by agreement of the
parties ( P-J ) and a new lease agreement for the use
of the motor grader was entered into on October 24,
HWn (Exhibit P-5). In this agreement, a stipulation
was included that "the motor grader operator shall
perform his duties to comply with Nelson Brothers
Conslrudiou Company's superintendent," and further
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provided that plaintiff could withdraw the machine
from the job by giving two weeks' written notice. Complaints were made by the government inspectors of
the work done by Robert Casey, Sr. as operator of the
motor grader. (Rl42, lines 21 to 29, Rl43 lines 24
to 28) Some of Mr. Casey's work had to be done over
(R144, lines 24 to 30) and the services of Robert Casey,
Sr. were terminated on instructions of .Mr. Orin Nelson
to .Mr. Wardle, superintendent and
Wardle instructed .Mr. Stone, his assistant, to terminate him.
(RI20, liens 7 to 13, and line 22) Mr. Robert Casey's
services were terminated on November 18, 1966. (R145,
lines 1 to 16) The plaintiff-respondent's motor grader
was used by defendant four hours on the 19th of December, 1966, and for eight hours on December 20,
1966 and for four hours on December 21, 1966, when
plaintiff came and took the motor patrol at 12 :00 o'clock
noon. ( R146, lines 5 to 12) to an unannounced and
undisclosed destination. (RI40, lines 4 to 7, Rl70 lines
1 to 4) There was a conflict of testimony as to the reason
for plaintiff taking the motor grader away from the
job. The court found that defendant ordered the
plaintiff to remove it from the job. (R44, paragraph
10) Plaintiff took the motor grader and parked it
with the
dealer in Gallup, New
Mexico. (R90, lines 22 and 23) At that time, the plaintiff had a deal pending with Hamilton Construction
Company in Gallup, who were bidding on a job, and
if successful, they would use plaintiff's equipment and
in so doing would make a place for the motor grader.
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(R90, lines 24 to 30; R91, line 1 to 12) An Indian
operated the motor patrol on December 19, 20 and 21,
1966 and the door had been allowed to swing open
and caught on one of the wheels and tore off the door
and cracked the windshield, just prior to the removal
of the grader. This caused Robert Casey to state when
he was asked where he was going with the grader
"\Ve're going to get it off the job before that Indian
tears it up." (R187, lines 1 to 11) This damage was
later repaired at Nelson Brothers' expense. (R 187,
lines 12 to 15) Neither the plaintiff nor his father
Rober Casey ever told the defendant or any of its
employees or disclosed the location of the motor grader
after the removal. (Hl40, lines 4 to 7 and Rl98, lines
13 to 21) Prior to and at the time that the grader was
removed from the defeudant's construction site, plaintiff
had a deal pending with IIamilton Construction Company in Gallup who were bidding on a job, and if they
were successful, they would use plaintiff's equipment,
and would thus make a place for the use of the grader.
(R90, lines 19 to .30 inclusive, R91 lines l to 14)
Forty-one thousand six hundred twenty-three
(-H,(i23) tons of sub-base and some gravel was put
down up to December 21, 1966 while plaintiff Casey's
motor grader was used together with Stone's grader,
(Hl84'. lines l to 21) 12,381 tons on plaintiff's original
subcnntrad and 29,242 more tons between October 24,
and tlie: 21st
of December, 1966. (Rl83, lines 27
to 30 awl
J l1> :21) J.7,000 tons were put down

dav
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after December 21, 1966 (R185, lines 3 to 5). 46.966(/c
of the tons of the sub-base and gravel was laid down
of
up to December 21, 1966. 47,000 tons or
all sub-base and gravel was laid down after December
21, 1966. Tonnage-wise the gravel laid dmvn after
December 21, 1966 was 112.9% of the tonnage of subbase and gravel laid down prior to December 21, 196ti.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1: THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN ALLO\VING "DAlHAGES FOR DEl-.ENDANT'S BREACH O.F RENTAL AGREEMENT ON MOTOR GRADER" IN THE
OF $6,123.00 OR FOR ANY SUlH \VHATEVER.
A. DEFENDANT HAD FULL AUTHORITY TO TER.MINATE THE SERVICES
OF R. E. CASEY.
The original subcontract and equipment lease
covered the lease of the motor grader in paragraph 16
and provided that it "is to be operated exclusively by
R. E. Casey, and that contractor shall pay $10.50 an
hour for its use, but in the event that R. E. Casey
was incapacitated or otherwise unable to operate, then
the rate to be paid for use of said grader with another
operator to be selected and paid by contractor would
be reduced to $8.50 per hour." (Exhibit P-1) This
was thereafter terminated (Exhibit P-4) and a "lease
agreement" was entered into October 24, 1966 (Ex6

hi bit P-5) This also provided that the grader was "to
be operated exclusively by R. E. Casey, Sr., whose
wages shall be paid by Nelson Brothers Construction
Company. The motor grader operator shall perform
his duties to comply with Nelson Brothers Construction
Company Superintendent." (Emphasis added) It thus
appears clear that defendant could terminate the services of R. E. Casey, Sr., if he failed to perform his
duties to comply with their requirement. In addition,
the plaintiff stated "that's immaterial to me who operates it (the motor grader), as long as Nelson's were
satisfied." (R99, lines 27 to 30)
R. E. Casey's services were terminated November
18, 1966. (R145, lines 2 to 16) l\ilr. Strong was the
assistant superintendent and was instructed by superintendent, l\ilr. Wardle, to terminate Robert Casey.
(Rl20, lines 18 to 22).
ll. PLAINTIFF ':VITHDRE'V FROl\I AND
ABANDONED "LEASE AGREElVIENT"
DATED OCTOBER 24, 1966 BY REl\IOVING THE MOTOR GRADER FROl\I
TIIE \VORK SITE AND NEVER INFORl\IING THE DEFENDANT OF ITS
LOCATION, OR THAT IT 'VAS
AVAILABLE FOR USE BY DEFENDANT AND THUS FORECLOSING ANY
POSSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S USE
OF THE SAME.
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Based on conflicting evidence, the court held that
the defendant ordered plaintiff to take the motor grader
off the job. ( R54) Plaintiff removed the motor grader
from the job on the 21st day of December, 1966. l\Ir.
Robert Casey actually drove it from the site of the
contract to an unannounced and undisclosed destination. (Rl45, lines 17 and 18, Rl46, lines 11 to 12, Rl40,
lines 4 to 7, RI 70, lines 1 to 4)
The Findings of Fact do not specify the time
that the defendant allegedly ordered plaintiff to take
the motor grader off the job. The plaintiff testified it
was on December 21st, 1966, the date that it was removed from the job. Other witnesses testified that l\Ir.
Nelson was on the job on the 13th of December, but
did not recall seeing him on th 21st of December, and
thought that he would have known about it. Mr. Orin
Nelson, officer of the defendant company, stated that
he was there on the job on the 11th or 12th of December ( RI68, lines 8 to 13) and on the 17th of December, 1966. Defendant wanted to use the Casey
grader but not being certain that they could use it
without using .Mr. Robert Casey as the operator, sent
a letter addressed to Leo Casey, Casey Construction
Company, c/o Zia Motel, Gallup, New :l\Iexico, asking
him generally about using the patrol. The original was
never returned to the defendant. (R177) Receipt of
this letter could have triggered the desire in plaintiff
to remove the motor grader from the job. Plaintiff,
at the time, was living at Zia l\1otel in Gallup. Plain-
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tiff denies receiving the letter. (RIOS, lines I6 to 25)
It clearly appears that the plaintiff had selfish reasons
for removing the motor grader, and he stated on direct
examination that he had a deal pending with Hamilton
Construction Company in Gallup. They were going
to bid on a job, and if they were successful in getting
it, they would use plaintiff's equipment and in so doing
could make a place for the motor grader. That nego·
tiation was under way prior to December 2I, 1966.
(R90, lines 22 to 30, and R9I, lines I to 8) In any
event, plaintiff moved the motor grader and, unbeknown to defendant parked it at the Massey-Ferguson
dealer in Gallup, (R90, lines I9 to 23, RI40 lines 4
to 7, R 17 0, lines I to 4 ) which was some thirty miles
away from the job site. (R90, lines I9 to 23, R78, lines
2 and 3) Plaintiff never at any time informed the
defendant or any of defendant's employees where the
motor grader was taken, either the town or the premises
within a town. ( RI40, lines 4 to 7, RI 70, lines I to 4,
and RI 7I, lines I4 to I6) It would have been impossible for defendant to use the motor grader after the
21st day of December, not knowing the lot where it
was located, and in fact not even the town that it had
been taken to. If the plaintiff claimed that the lease
agreement was still in effect, it would be incumbent
upon him to inform the defendant that he was holding
the motor grader subject to the terms of the lease
agreement, where it was located and that they could
use the same as provided in the lease with any operator
that was satisfactory to the defendant Nelson Brothers
9

Construction Company. Taking the motor grader to
an unannounced and undisclosed destination was wholly
inconsistent with the existence of the contract aud
defendant was powerless to do anything but acquiesce.
This falls within the rule that a contract will be treated
as abandoned where the acts of one party inconsistent
with its existence are acquiesced in by the other. See
Monroe vs. Fetzer, 350 P.2d 1012 (Wash.) The contract may be mutually abandoned by the parties at any
stage of its performance or before any performance
has commenced, and by such abandonment each party
is released from any further performance, (as in the
instant action) or each party is released from any performance at all. Honda vs. Reed, 319 P. 2d 728 (Calif.)
See also Ferris vs. Blumhardt, 293 P. 2d 935 (Wash.)
In the case of Jensen vs. Chandler, 291 P. 2d 1116
(Idaho) the court said in part as follows :
"A contract may be discharged by conduct as
well as by words. 12 Am. J ur. Contracts lOll,
Sec. 431. An abandonment of a contract by consent may be implied from acts of the parties.
Thompson vs. Municipal Bond Company, 23
Calif. App. 2d 402, 73 P. 2d 274. Treadwell vs.
Niclcel, 194 Calif. 243, 228 P. 25.
"A rescission by consent is implied by refusal
of one party to comply with the contract, in
which refusal the other party has acquiesced.
Carter vs. Fox, 11 Calif. App. 67, 103 P. 910;
Mettler vs. Vance, 30 Calif. App. 499, 158 P.
1044.
"A contract will be treated as abandoned where
the acts of one party inconsistent with its exist·
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euee was acquiesced in by the other party. Hobbs
zw. Colurnbia lt'alls 1Jrick Co., 1.57 1\-Iass. 109, 31
N. E. 75ti. JI crµolslteimer vs. Christopher, 76
Neb. 352, 107 N. \V. 082, 111 N. W. 359, 9

L.R.A., N. S. 1127; King nian Colony Irr. Co.
152 P. 891; 17 C.J.S.,
vs. Payne, 7'8 Or.
Contracts, para. 389, P. 882.

"It is generally held that it is a question of
ultimate faet as to whether a contract has been
abandoned or mutually rescinded."

The above portion of the opinion in Jensen vs.
Chandler, supra, was quoted with approval in the case
of C Qpenhaver vs. Lavin, 448 P. 2d 77 4 (Idaho) . The
case of Griffin vs. Beresa, Incorporated, 300 P. 2d 31
(Calif. ) , has facts that are more similar to the case
at hand than most of the cases above quoted. Griffin
performed work, labor and furnished material to defendant for the construction of septic tanks and drains
on defendant's property. There had been some misunderstandmg as to financing and the quality of plaintiff's work was questioned and the defendant took over
the job, including the personnel and equipment which
Griffin had on the site. After Griffin went there and
insisted that he had fully performed his contract and
he was willing to go forward and complete it, nevertheless. he, after some conversation with appellant's
supen·ising officers withdrew his equipment and surrendered the job. The court stated in part of its opinion
.ts follows:

•••••ir

''An abandonment of a contract may be implied from the acts of the parties,
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• • • • • • a n d this
may be accomplished by the repudiation of the
contract by one of the parties and the acquiescence of the other party in such repudiation,
and words of the parties to the effect that they
are mutually rescinding the contract are not
necessary. McCreary vs. Mercury Lumber Distributors, 124 Cal. App. 2d 477, 486, 268 P. 2d
762."

Attention also is invited to 17 Am. J ur. 2d, paragraph 484, Abandonment, at page 954.
Findings of Facts state "defendant failed and
refu.sed to use said motor grader after December 21,
1966" (R53, para 6, lines 6 and 7) It appears that
this was based on the Finding No. 10 that defendant
ordered plaintiff to take the motor grader off the job.
(R54) It must, however, be kept in mind that imme·
diately after plaintiff took the motor grader off the
job, defendant had to rent two more motor graders to
complete the job, and if the plaintiff did not elect to
discontinue the agreement, it was incumbent upon him
to notify the defendant that the motor grader was
available, and give the location of the same, and that
it was available to carry out the 'terms of the lease
agreement. In view of the fact that plaintiff took the
motor grader and placed it in a town some thirty miles
distance and never notified the defendant where it was
located so that defendant would be able to use the same
to complete the contract despite plaintiff's protestations
now that he did not discontinue the agreement, his
actions making it impossible for the defendant to use
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the motor grader were inconsistent with his alleged
declared desire to continue the agreement; and if it is
true that defendant ordered plaintiff to remove the
motor grader which defendant does not admit and
states is not true, then if this be considered a repudiation
of the contract, the taking of the machine which was
the subject of the lease agreement, the motor grader,
to an undisclosed location can only be an acquiescence
hy plajntiff in such repudiation. If the plaintiff wish<>d
to continue with the agreement and intended tu charge
the defendant with the rental to become due, it \Vas
incumbent upon the plaintiff to keep the motm grader
available for use by the defendant. His failure to do
this was clearly an acquiescence in the action of the
defendant alleged by plaintiff that the defendant
ordered him to remove lhe motor grader from the job.
lf the view is taken that defendant did not order the
motor grader from the job, the results are the same.
The motor grader was being used and was used up
until noon of December 21, 1966, the day that it was
removed from the job. This was known by the plaintiff because of the fad he questioned the ability of the
operator who was handling the motor grader, and clearly
the removal would be a breach by plaintiff and under
these cirl'umstances the action or non-action of the
<let'endant '\vould be considered acquiescence. In fact,
the defendant was 11ot sure that he had the right to
tht' motor grader wheu ming another operator. Delt·11dant also knew that plaintiff could terminate without
,i llst by giving notice.
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It appears_ that the plaintiff deliberately moved
the motor grader from the work site without informing
the defendant of its location so that he would have
it available for a job that he hoped would soon come
up; that in doing this, he breached the agreement him
self, and made it impossible for the defendant to continue using the motor grader, and this despite the fact
that the grader was being used on the very day that
it was taken from the job, according to the evidence,
during the noon hour on December 21, 1966.
See cases cited in Sauder vs. Dittmar, 118 F. 2d 524,
key numbers 9 to 12 inclusive at page 530. See also
Wallace vs. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P. 2d 699,
which cites the case of Monroe vs. Fetzer, supra. Also
see Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d
491.

C. DAMAGES 'i\TERE EXCESSIVE EVEN
IF IT WAS ASSUMED THE AGREE·
MENT WAS NOT ABANDONED NOR
\\TITHDRA'i\TN FROM BY PLAINTIFF.
Mr. Nelson testified that the completed tallies shown
in charge-order No. 4 showed that 12,381.1 tons were
laid down and were handled by the two graders up to
the termination of the subcontract on October 24,
1966, and that 29,242 tons were laid down between
October 24 and the 21st day of December, 1966, for
a total tonnage of 41,623 tons handled by the Casey
Motor grader and the other motor grader on the job
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up to December 21st, 1900 ( Rl84) There were 47 ,000
tons requiri11g the use of motor graders after the 21st
of December, 196u, (Rl85, lines l to 7) for a total of
88,(i23 tuns, and this makes J.l,o2a tons involved with
the Casey and Stone motor graders, which amounts
to 46.9G/; of the total. According to the uncontroverted
testimony of :\Ir. Orin N e]son, the bulk of the grading
was do11e when the Casey grader was used on the job,
(R185, lines 14 to 17, R186, lines l
but assuming
that the same number of hours per ton would be required, which gives the advantage to the plaintiff,
nccordiug to the only testimony on record in this respect,
53.0.J.)r of the job that was done after the 21st day
of December would then require a total of 393.05 hours,
and using plaintiff's figure of $9.00 an hour, damages
would not be more than $3,537..J.5. The judgment given
by the court for damages of $6,123.00 exceeds this by
$2,585.55 and there is no testimony controverting the
exaet figures testified to by
N e]son.

POINT NO. 11: THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ERRED lK
DEFENDANT'S l\IOTIOX FOR A NE'V TRIAL.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was based on
(a) :u·ciclent or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not ha re guarded against; ( b) to newly discovered
e'_ideue.('. material for the defen<lr.nt which
not
w1tl1 r<'asonablc dilige11ee han:
and produced at lhc trial under the circumstances; and (c)

15

excessive damages appearing to have been given un<ler
the influence of passion or prejudice. ( R49) Affidavit
in support of this motion of the attorney for defendant
more fully sets forth the grounds of the motion for a
new trial.
J. Royal Andreason prepared the original pleadings and handled the case originally until his death.
The present attorney for defendant was ill at the time
the matter came to him, and this cut short the time to
prepare for the case. The grounds (a) and ( c) are
submitted on the affidavit above referred to.
The newly discovered evidence, material for the
defendant, consists of records which the affiant was nm
able in the limited time available to discover which
show that one grader was rented from Russ Caterpillar
for one month, December 22, 1966 to January 22, 1Uli7,
for $1,000.00 and was used for a total of 149 hours,
in which time all of the balance of the work contern·
plated by the contract with plaintiff was completed,
including all the gravel laid and graded to allow the
subcontractor 'V rockloff & Garner to complete the
installation of the road mix bituminous surfacing 011
the road. If the Casey grader were used for the UD
hours required to finish the job at $9.00 per hour would
make the total damages $1,341. Defendant
that the plaintiff is entitled to no damages whatsoever.
but that he could not justify damages in excess of $1,34< l
POINT NO. III. THE DISTRICT COUR'f
ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S l\IO·
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PROPOSED
UF FACT _/lND CONCLUSIONS OF LA 1\V A:\TD
JUDGMENT AS SET FORTI-I IN
G-HAPHS 3 TO 12 INCLUSIVE OF SAID
MOTION.
TlON TO

Paragraphs 3 to 7 of said motion covered undisputed facts testified to at trial or contained in
admitted exhibits. Paragraphs 8 to 12 of said motion
had to do with the main issue of damages, which has
beeu previously discussed in this brief.

It is submitted that paragraphs 3 to 7 of said
motion should be graute<l as a matter of course because
they covered undbr·uted facts testified to at the trial,
or contained in admitte<l exhibits.
Paragraph 8 of said motion asked that the court
find that the plaintiff had abandoned the contract.
results would appear to be the same whether plaintiff
abandoned the co11tract or acquiesced in the repudiation
of the contract by defendant; and regardless of plaintiff's insistence that he did not withdraw from the contrad, the fact still remains that plaintiff removed the
rnotur grader to a city unknown and to an unknown
location in the unkrnm n city, and never at any time
.1thised the defendant that it was aYailable for its use.
lt appears that plaintiff's protestations that it didn't
mah any difference to him who operated the grader
so it satisfied the defendant, Nelson Brothers Co11. . trud1on Compauy. is not carried out by his action.
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It is further pointed out that it was virtually
impossible to get hold of the plaintiff, and. if the plain·
tiff really intended to stay with the contract, it wa)
incumbent upon him to notify the defendant that hi
was holding them on the contract, that the motor gra<ler
was available at the definite location for the defendant
to use in accordance with the lease agreement. Thi\
was not done and the location of the motor grader on
any lot or even the city it was located in was newr
divulged to the defendant. It is submitted that this i.1
in fact abandonment of contract by the plaintiff, or
it was an acquiescence in the repudiation by the defendant if plaintiff's testimony is believed. A motion
to strike paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 141 and to strike
paragraph 15 of Conclusions of Law and substitute
another paragraph therefor, and to amend paragraph
16 and the judgment are all based on the facts pre·
viously discussed.

SUMMARY
If the defendant did in fact tell plaintiff to get

the motor grader off the job, then clearly the actio11
of plaintiff in removing the same was acquiescence a11cl
with greater finality by the taking of the motor grader
to an unannounced destination, either as to city or
location within a city is an act that is wholly inco11·
sistent with the existence of the contract. The
result is reached if the defendant's view is taken tha1
defendant did not order the removal of the motor
grader, and, therefore, the removal was an abando11·
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me 11 t by the plaintiff, wliieh abandonment the def
wa:, forced to acquiesce in, first, because the location of
the motor grader was unknown to defendant, and sec·
011 d, because the defendant was not certain that he had
absolute right to use the motor grader when not using
R. E. Casey as the operator. Furthermore, defendant
was aware that under the terms of the lease agreeme:1t,
plaintiff could withdraw hy giving two weeks' notice
in any eYent, so defendant was not certain that plaintiff would allow defernlant to use the motor grader
to complete the job. Defendant is entitled to a judgment
reYersing that portion of the judgment of the District
Court based on damages in the amount of $t>,li3 "for
defendant's breach of rental agreement on motor grader,'' or failing that:
A. That an order be entered remauding said actiou
to the District Court for a new trial only as to damages
suffered by plaintiff due to defendant's alleged failure
and refusal to use said motor grader. Or failing that;
B. That an order be entered reducing the element
of <lamages from $6, I i3 to
as the only amount
supported by definite figures produced at the trial.
Respectfully submitted,
REED II. RICIIARDS
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
500 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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